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Abstract
We study a model where a decision maker (DM) must select an adviser to advise
her about an unknown state of the world. There is a pool of available advisers who
all have the same underlying preferences as the DM; they differ, however, in their
prior beliefs about the state, which we interpret as differences of opinion. We derive
a tradeoff faced by the DM: an adviser with a greater difference of opinion has greater
incentives to acquire information, but reveals less of any information she acquires,
via strategic disclosure. Nevertheless, it is optimal to choose an adviser with at least
some difference of opinion. The analysis reveals two novel incentives for an agent
to acquire information: a “persuasion” motive and a motive to “avoid prejudice.”
Delegation is costly for the DM because it eliminates both of these incentives. We
also study the relationship between difference of opinion and difference of preference.
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“Difference of opinion leads to enquiry.” — Thomas Jefferson
1 Introduction
To an average 17th century (geocentric) person, the emerging idea of the earth moving
defied common sense. If the earth revolves, then “why would heavy bodies falling down
from on high go by a straight and vertical line to the surface of the earth... [and] not travel,
being carried by the whirling earth, many hundreds of yards to the east?” (Galilei, 1953,
p. 126) In the face of this seemingly irrefutable argument, Galileo Galilei told a famous
story, via his protagonist Salviati in Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems,
about how an observer locked inside a boat, sailing at a constant speed without rocking,
cannot tell whether the boat is moving or not. This story, meant to persuade critics of
heliocentrism, became a visionary insight now known as the Galilean Principle of Relativity.
The above example dramatically illustrates how a different view of the world (literally)
might lead to an extraordinary discovery. But the theme it captures is hardly unique.
Indeed, difference of opinion is valued in many organizations and situations. Corporations
seek diversity in their workforce allegedly to tap creative ideas. Academic research thrives
on the pitting of opposing hypotheses. Government policy failures are sometimes blamed
on the lack of a dissenting voice in the cabinet, a phenomenon coined “groupthink” by
psychologists (e.g. Janis, 1972). Debates between individuals can be more illuminating
when they take different views; in their absence, debaters often create an artificial difference
by playing “devil’s advocate.”
Difference of opinion would be obviously valuable if it inherently entails a productive
advantage in the sense of bringing new ideas or insights that would otherwise be unavailable.
But could it be valuable even when it brings no direct productive advantage? Moreover,
are there any costs of people having differing opinions? This paper explores these questions
by examining incentive implications of difference of opinion.
We develop a model in which a decision maker, or DM for short, consults an adviser
before making a decision. There is an unknown state of the world that affects both in-
dividuals’ payoff from the decision. We model the DM’s decision and the state of the
world as real numbers, and assume the DM’s optimal decision coincides with the state.
Initially, neither the DM nor the adviser has any information about the state beyond their
prior views. The adviser can exert effort to try and produce an informative signal about
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the state, which occurs with probability that is increasing in his effort. The signal could
take the form of scientific evidence obtainable by conducting an experiment, witnesses or
documents locatable by investigation, a mathematical proof, or a convincing insight that
can reveal something about the state. Effort is unverifiable, however, and higher effort
imposes a greater cost on the adviser. After the adviser privately observes the information,
he strategically communicates with the DM. Communication takes the form of verifiable
disclosure: sending a message is costless, but the adviser cannot falsify information, or
equivalently, the DM can judge objectively what a signal means. The adviser can, nev-
ertheless, choose not to disclose the information he acquires. Finally, the DM takes her
decision optimally given her updated beliefs after communication with the adviser.
This framework captures common situations encountered by many organizations. For
instance, managers solicit information from employees; political leaders seek the opinion of
their cabinet members; scientific boards consult experts; and journal editors rely on referees.
But the model permits broader interpretations: the DM could be the general public (such
as 17th century intelligent laymen), and its decision is simply the posterior belief on some
matter. In turn, the adviser could be a scientist (such as Galileo), investigator, special
counsel, a lobbying group, or a debater trying to sway that belief.
It is often the case, as in the examples mentioned above, that an adviser is interested in
the decision taken by DM. We assume initially that the adviser has the same fundamental
preferences as the DM about which decision to take in each state, but that he may have
a difference of opinion about what the unknown state is likely to be. More precisely, the
adviser may disagree with the DM about the prior probability distribution of the unknown
state, and this disagreement is common knowledge.1 Such disagreements abound in many
circumstances, as has also been argued by, for example, Banerjee and Somanathan (2001).
Consider a firm that must decide which of two technologies to invest in. All employees
share the common goal of investing in the better technology, but no one knows which this
is. Different employees may hold different beliefs about the viability of each technology,
leading to open disagreements about where to invest. As another example, a general and
her advisers may agree on the objective of winning a war at minimum cost. They may have
1That is, they “agree to disagree.” Such an open disagreement may arise from various sources: indi-
viduals may simply be endowed with different prior beliefs (just as they may be endowed with different
preferences), or they may update certain kinds of public information differently based on psychological,
cultural, or other factors (Acemoglu, Chernozhukov, and Yildiz, 2007; Aumann, 1976; Tversky and Kah-
neman, 1974). Whatever the reason, open disagreements do exist and often persist even after extensive
debates and communication.
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different beliefs, however, about the strength of the opposition troops, leading to disagree-
ments about how many of their own troops should be sent into combat—disagreements that
do not change even when told each other’s views. Many political disagreements also seem
best viewed through the lens of different prior beliefs rather than different fundamental
preferences (Dixit and Weibull, 2007).2
Specifically, we model the adviser’s opinion as the mean of his (subjective) prior about
the state, normalizing the DM’s opinion to mean zero. We suppose that there is a rich
pool of possible advisers in terms of their opinion, and advisers are differentiated only by
their opinion, meaning that a difference of opinion does not come with better ability or
lower cost of acquiring information. This formulation allows us to examine directly whether
difference of opinion alone can be valuable to the DM, even without any direct productive
benefits.3
Our main results concern a tradeoff associated with difference of opinion. To see this,
suppose first that effort is not a choice variable for the adviser. In this case, the DM
has no reason to prefer an adviser with a differing opinion. In fact, unless the signal is
perfectly informative about the state, the DM will strictly prefer a like-minded adviser—
i.e., one with the same opinion as she has. This is because agents with different opinions,
despite having the same preference, will generally arrive at different posteriors about what
the right decision is given partially-informative signals. Consequently, an adviser with a
differing opinion will typically withhold some information from the DM. This strategic
withholding of information entails a welfare loss for the DM, whereas no such loss will arise
if the adviser is like-minded.
When effort is endogenous, the DM is also concerned with the adviser’s incentive to exert
effort; all else equal, she would prefer an adviser who will exert as much effort as possible.
We find that differences of opinion provide incentives for information acquisition, for two
distinct reasons. First, an adviser with a difference of opinion is motivated to persuade
the DM. Such an adviser believes that the DM’s opinion is wrong, and that by acquiring
a signal, he is likely to move the DM’s decision towards what he perceives to be the right
decision. This motive does not exist for the like-minded adviser. Second, and more subtle,
an adviser with difference of opinion will exert effort to avoid “prejudice.” Intuitively,
2To mention just two examples, consider disagreements about how serious the global warming problem
is (if it exists all, to some) and how to protect a country against terrorism.
3As previously noted, individuals with different backgrounds and experiences are also likely to bring
different approaches and solutions to a problem, which may directly improve the technology of production.
We abstract from these in order to focus on the incentive implications of difference of opinion.
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in equilibrium, an adviser withholds information that is contrary to his opinion, for such
information will cause the DM to take an action that the adviser dislikes. Recognizing this,
the DM discounts the advice she receives and chooses an action contrary to the adviser’s
opinion, unless the advice is corroborated by a hard evidence—this equilibrium feature of
strategic interaction is what we call a “prejudicial effect.” Hence, an adviser with difference
of opinion has incentives to seek out information in order to avoid prejudice, a motive that
does not exist for a like-minded adviser.
In summary, we find that difference of opinion entails a loss of information through
strategic communication, but creates incentives for information acquisition. This tradeoff
resonates with common notions that, on the one hand, diversity of opinion causes increased
conflict because it becomes harder to agree on solutions—this emerges in our analysis as
worsened communication; on the other hand (as was recognized by Jefferson, quoted in our
epigraph) it also leads to increased efforts to understand and convince other individuals—
this emerges here as increased information acquisition.
How should the DM resolve this tradeoff between information acquisition and transmis-
sion? We find that the DM prefers an adviser with some difference of opinion to a perfectly
like-minded one. The reason is that an adviser with sufficiently small difference of opinion
engages in only a negligible amount of strategic withholding of information, so the loss
associated with such a difference is negligible. By the same token, the prejudicial effect
and its beneficial impact on information acquisition is also negligible when the difference of
opinion is small. In contrast, the persuasion motive that even a slight difference of opinion
generates—and thus the benefit the DM enjoys from its impact on increased effort—is non-
negligible by comparison. Therefore, the DM strictly benefits from an adviser with at least
a little difference in opinion, and would not optimally choose a like-minded adviser from
a rich pool of available individuals. Applied to a broader context, our result implies that
new discoveries are more likely to come from those with different views about the world
(than would be explainable by their population composition), and the public interest can
be served by them even though they will not reveal what they know all the time.
Sections 2–4 formalize our model and the above logic. Section 5 then augments the
model to allow the adviser to differ from the DM in both his opinion and his fundamental
preferences over decisions. Heterogeneous preferences have a similar effect as difference
of opinion on strategic disclosure. But this similarity does not extend to the adviser’s
choice of effort, because the two attributes are fundamentally distinct in terms of how they
motivate the adviser. While an adviser with difference of opinion has a persuasion motive
5
for acquiring a signal—he expects to systematically shift the DM’s decision closer to his
preferred decision—an adviser with only a difference of preference has no such expectation,
and thus has no persuasion motive. For this reason, having an adviser who differs only in
preferences yields no clear benefit for the DM.
Nevertheless, we find the difference of preferences to be valuable in the presence of
difference of opinion. In other words, an adviser with a different opinion has more incentive
to acquire information if he also has an preference bias in the direction congruent to his
opinion. This complementarity between preference and opinion implies that the incentive
effect on information acquisition will be larger when the adviser is a zealot—one who
believes that evidence is likely to move the DM’s action in the direction of his preference
bias—than when he is a skeptic—one who is doubtful that information about the state of
the world will support his preference bias.
We explore some other issues in Section 6. Of particular interest, we find that the
benefit from difference of opinion is lost when the DM delegates the decision authority to
the adviser. This observation sheds new light on the merit of delegation in organizational
settings (cf. Aghion and Tirole, 1997). We also discuss implications of the adviser’s percep-
tion of the precision of his own information, or his confidence, finding that more confident
advisers exert more effort.
Our paper builds on the literature on strategic communication, combining elements
from the structure of conflicts of interest in Crawford and Sobel (1982) with the verifiable
disclosure game first introduced by Grossman (1981) and Milgrom (1981). The key inno-
vation in this regard is that we endogenize information acquisition and focus on the effects
of difference of prior beliefs. It is best to postpone a discussion of the most closely related
literature to Section 7, after a full development of our model and analysis. Section 8 then
concludes with a discussion of our modeling choices and possible extensions. The Appendix
contains omitted proofs.
2 Model
A decision maker (DM) must take a decision, a ∈ R. The appropriate decision depends
on an unknown state of the world, ω ∈ R. The DM lacks the necessary expertise, or finds
it prohibitively costly, to directly acquire information about the state, but can choose a
single adviser from a pool of available agents to advise her.
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Prior Beliefs. We allow individuals—potential advisers and the DM—to have different
prior beliefs about the state. Specifically, while all individuals know the state is distributed
according to a Normal distribution with variance σ20 > 0, individual i believes the mean
of the distribution is µi. The prior beliefs of each person are common knowledge.
4 We
will refer to an adviser’s prior belief as his opinion or type, even though it is not private
information. Two individuals, i and j, have differences of opinion if µi 6= µj. Without loss
of generality, we normalize the DM’s prior to µ = 0. An adviser with µ = 0 is said to be
like-minded.
Full-information preferences. All players have the same von Neumann-Morgenstern
state-dependent payoff from the DM’s decision:
ui(a, ω) := −(a− ω)2.
Thus, were the state ω known, players would agree on the optimal decision a = ω. In this
sense, there is no fundamental preference conflict. We allow for such conflicts in Section 5.
The quadratic loss function we use is a common specification in the literature: it captures
the substantive notion that decisions are progressively worse the further they are from the
true state, and technically, makes the analysis tractable.
Information Acquisition. Regardless of the chosen adviser’s type, his investigation
technology is the same, described as follows. He chooses the probability that his investi-
gation is successful, p ∈ [0, 1], at a cost c(p). The function c(·) is smooth, c′′(·) > 0, and
satisfies the Inada conditions c′(0) = 0 and c′(p) → ∞ as p → 1. We will interchangeably
refer to p as an effort level or a probability.5 With probability p, the adviser obtains a sig-
nal about the state, s ∼ N (ω, σ21). That is, the signal is drawn from a Normal distribution
with mean equal to the true state and variance σ21 > 0. With complementary probability
1 − p, he receives no signal, denoted by ∅. Thus, effort is success-enhancing in the sense
of Green and Stokey (2007) and increases information in the sense of Blackwell (1951).
4Although game-theoretic models often assume a common prior, referred to as the Harsanyi Doctrine,
there is a significant and growing literature that analyzes games with heterogenous priors. Banerjee and
Somanathan (2001) and Spector (2000) do so in communication models with exogenous information; in
other contexts, examples are Eliaz and Spiegler (2006), Harrington (1993), Van den Steen (2005), and
Yildiz (2003). For a general discussion about non-common priors, see Morris (1995).
5This is justified because our formulation is equivalent to assuming the adviser chooses some effort e at
cost c(e), which maps into a probability p(e), where p(0) = 0 and p(·) is a strictly increasing function.
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Communication. After privately observing the outcome of his investigation, the cho-
sen adviser strategically discloses information to the DM. The signal s is “hard” or non-
falsifiable. Hence, the adviser can only withhold the signal if he has obtained one; if he
did not receive a signal, he has no choice to make. The signal may be non-manipulable
because there are large penalties against fraud, information is easily verifiable by the DM
once received (even though impossible to acquire herself), or information is technologically
hard to manipulate.6
Timing. The sequence of events is as follows. First, the DM selects an adviser from an
available set of adviser types, [µ, µ], where µ < 0 < µ. The selected adviser then chooses
effort and observes the outcome of his investigation, both unobservable to the DM. In the
third stage, the adviser either discloses or withholds any information acquired. Finally, the
DM takes a decision.
As this is multi-stage Bayesian game, it is appropriate to solve it using the concept
of perfect Bayesian equilibrium (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991), or for short, equilibrium
hereafter. We restrict attention to pure strategy equilibria.
2.1 Interim Bias
As a prelude to our analysis, it is useful to identify the players’ preferences over decisions
when the state is not known. Throughout, we use subscripts DM and A for the decision
maker and adviser, respectively. Under the Normality assumptions in our information
structure, the signal and state joint distribution can be written, from the perspective of
player i = DM,A, as (
ω
s
)
∼ N
(
µi
µi
,
(
σ20 σ
2
0
σ20 σ
2
0 + σ
2
1
))
.
Without a signal about the state, the expected utility of player i is maximized by action µi.
Suppose a signal s is observed. The posterior of player i is that ω|s ∼ N (ρs+ (1− ρ)µi, σ˜2),
6Our formulation follows, for example, Shin (1998). Alternatively, we could assume that the adviser
must make an assertion that the signal lies in some compact set, S, or R, with the only constraint that
s ∈ S, as formulated by Milgrom (1981). In this case, when the signal is not observed, the adviser has to
report R. By endowing the DM with a “skeptical posture” (Milgrom and Roberts, 1986) when the adviser
claims any set S 6= R, our analysis can be extended to this setting.
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where ρ :=
σ20
σ20+σ
2
1
and σ˜2 :=
σ20σ
2
1
σ20+σ
2
1
(Degroot, 1970).7 Player i = DM,A therefore has the
following expected utility from action a given s:
E[ui(a, ω)|s, µi] = −E[(a− ω)2|s, µi] = −(a− E[ω|s, µi])2 − Var(ω|s)
= − (a− {ρs+ (1− ρ)µi})2 − σ˜2. (1)
Clearly, the expected utility is maximized by an action α(s|µi) := ρs + (1 − ρ)µi, where
α(s|µ) is simply the posterior mean for a player with type µ.
Equation (1) shows that so long as signals are not perfectly informative of the state
(ρ < 1), differences of opinion generate conflicts in preferred decisions given any signal,
even though fundamental preferences agree. Accordingly, we define the interim bias as
B(µ) := (1 − ρ)µ. This completely captures the difference in the two players’ preferences
over actions given any signal because α(s|µ) = α(s|0) +B(µ). Observe that for any µ 6= 0,
sign(B(µ)) = sign(µ) but |B(µ)| < |µ|. Hence, while interim bias persists in the same
direction as prior bias, it is of strictly smaller magnitude because information about the
state mitigates prior disagreement about the optimal decision. This simple observation
turns out to have significant consequences. The magnitude of interim bias depends upon
how precise the signal is relative to the prior; differences of opinion matter very little once
a signal is acquired if the signal is sufficiently precise, i.e. for any µ, B(µ) → 0 as ρ → 1
(equivalently, as σ21 → 0 or σ20 →∞).
3 Equilibrium Disclosure Behavior
In this section, we analyze the behavior of adviser and DM in the disclosure sub-game.8
For this purpose, it will be sufficient to focus on the interim bias of the adviser, B(µ), and
the DM’s belief about the probability which the adviser observes a signal, p < 1.9 Hence,
we take the pair (B, p) with p < 1 as a primitive parameter in this section. Our objective
7Since σ20 > 0 and σ
2
1 > 0, ρ ∈ (0, 1). However, it will be convenient at points to discuss the case of
ρ = 1; this should be thought of as the limiting case where σ21 = 0, so that signals are perfectly informative
about the state. Similarly for ρ = 0.
8Strictly speaking, we are abusing terminology in referring to this as a “sub-game,” because the DM
does not observe the adviser’s effort choice, p.
9The subsequent analysis will show why the DM’s belief about this adviser’s effort, rather than the
true effort, is what matters for disclosure behavior. (Of course, we will require this belief to correct when
we analyze the information acquisition stage.) We can restrict attention to p < 1 because of the Inada
conditions on effort cost.
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is to characterize the set S ∈ R of signals that the adviser withholds and the action a∅ the
DM chooses when there is no disclosure. Plainly, when s is disclosed, the DM will simply
choose her most-preferred action, α(s|0) = ρs.
We start by fixing an arbitrary action a ∈ R the DM may choose in the event of
nondisclosure, and ask whether the adviser will disclose his signal if he observes it, assuming
that B ≥ 0 (the logic is symmetric when B < 0). The answer can be obtained easily with
the aid of Figure 1 below. The figure depicts, as a function of the signal, the action most
preferred by the DM (ρs) and the action most preferred by the adviser (ρs + B): each is
a straight line, the latter shifted up from the former by the constant B. Since the DM
will choose the action ρs whenever s is disclosed, the adviser will withhold s whenever the
nondisclosure action a is closer to his most-preferred action, ρs + B, than the disclosure
action, ρs. This reasoning identifies the nondisclosure interval as the “flat” region of the
solid line, which corresponds to the nondisclosure action chosen by the DM.
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Figure 1: Optimal non-disclosure region
As seen in Figure 1, the adviser’s best response is to withhold s (in case he observes s)
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if and only if s ∈ R(B, a) := [l (B, a) , h (a)] defined by
h (a) =
a
ρ
, (2)
l(B, a) = h (a)− 2B
ρ
. (3)
At s = h(a), the DM will choose a = α (h(a)|0) whether s is disclosed or not, so the adviser
is indifferent. At s = l(B, a), the adviser is again indifferent between disclosure, which leads
to α (l(B, a)|0) = a − 2B, and nondisclosure, which leads to a, because they are equally
distant from his most preferred action, a − B. For any s /∈ [l(B, a), h(a)], disclosure will
lead to an action closer to the adviser’s preferred action than would nondisclosure.10
Next, we characterize the DM’s best response in terms of her nondisclosure action, for
an arbitrary (measurable) set S ⊂ R of signals that the adviser may withhold. Her best
response is to take the action that is equal to her posterior expectation of the state given
nondisclosure, which is computed via Bayes rule:
aN(p, S) =
pρ
∫
S
sγ (s; 0) ds
p
∫
S
γ (s; 0) ds+ 1− p, (4)
where γ(s;µ) is a Normal density with mean µ and variance σ20 + σ
2
1. Notice that the
DM uses her own prior µDM = 0 to update her belief. It is immediate that if S has zero
expected value, then aN(p, S) = 0. More importantly, for any p > 0, aN(p, S) increases
when S gets larger in the strong set order.11 Intuitively, the DM rationally raises her action
when she suspects the adviser of not disclosing larger values of s.
An equilibrium of the disclosure sub-game requires that both the DM and the adviser
must play best responses. This translates into a simple fixed point requirement:
S = R (B, a) and aN(p, S) = a. (5)
Given any (B, p), let (S(B, p), a∅(B, p)) be a pair that satisfies (5), and let s(B, p) and
s(B, p) respectively denote the smallest and the largest elements of S(B, p). The following
result ensures that these objects are uniquely defined; its proof, and all subsequent proofs
not in the text, are in the Appendix.
10We assume nondisclosure when indifferent, but this is immaterial.
11A set S is larger than S′ in the strong set order if for any s ∈ S and s′ ∈ S′, max{s, s′} ∈ S and
min{s, s′} ∈ S′.
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Proposition 1. (Disclosure Equilibrium) For any (B, p) with p < 1, there is a unique
equilibrium in the disclosure sub-game. In equilibrium, both s(B, p) and s(B, p) are equal to
zero if B = 0, are strictly decreasing in B when p > 0, and strictly decreasing (increasing)
in p if B > 0 (if B < 0). The nondisclosure action a∅(B, p) is zero if B = 0 or p = 0, is
strictly decreasing in B for p > 0, and is strictly decreasing (increasing) in p if B > 0 (if
B < 0).
It is straightforward that the adviser reveals his information fully to the DM if and
only if B = 0, i.e. there is no interim bias. To see the effect of an increase in B (when
p > 0), notice from (2) and (3) that if the DM’s nondisclosure action did not change,
the upper endpoint of the adviser’s nondisclosure region would not change, but he would
withhold more low signals. Consequently, by (4), the DM must adjust his nondisclosure
action downward, which has the effect of pushing down both endpoints of the adviser’s
nondisclosure region. The new fixed point must therefore feature a smaller nondisclosure
set (in the sense of strong set order) and a lower nondisclosure action from the DM. We call
this the prejudicial effect, since a more upwardly biased adviser is in essence punished with
a lower inference when he claims not to have observed a signal.12 The prejudicial effect
implies in particular that for any p > 0 and B 6= 0, a∅(B, p)B < 0.
The impact of p can be traced similarly. An increase in p makes it more likely that
nondisclosure from the adviser is due to withholding of information rather than a lack of
signal. If B > 0 (resp. B < 0), this makes the DM put higher probability on the signal
being low (resp. high), leading to a decrease (resp. increase) in the nondisclosure action,
which decreases (resp. increases) the nondisclosure set in the strong set order.
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that the adviser’s optimal disclosure behavior depends
directly only on his interim bias, B, and the DM’s nondisclosure action, a∅. In particular,
it does not depend directly on the probability of acquiring a signal, although the the DM’s
belief about this probability affects the DM’s nondisclosure action, and thereby, indirectly,
the adviser’s disclosure choice.
12As an application, consider the inference that would have been drawn about Bill Clinton’s likelihood
of guilt in the Monica Lewinksy scandal should special counsel Ken Starr have not turned up any evidence
(Starr is generally perceived to be Right-leaning); contrast this with the public’s inference had a Left-leaning
special counsel claimed the same.
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4 Opinions as Incentives
This section studies how the adviser’s opinion affects his incentive to acquire information,
and the implications this has on the optimal type of adviser for the DM. As a benchmark,
the following Proposition establishes the fairly obvious point that, absent information ac-
quisition concerns, the optimal adviser is a like-minded one.
Proposition 2. (Exogenous Effort) If the probability of acquiring a signal is held
fixed at some p > 0, the uniquely optimal type of adviser for the DM is like-minded, i.e. an
adviser with µ = 0.
Proof. For any p > 0, S(µ, p) has positive measure when µ > 0, whereas S(0, p) has
measure zero. Hence, the adviser µ = 0 reveals the signal whenever she obtains one, whereas
an adviser with µ 6= 0 withholds the signal with positive probability. The result follows
from the fact that DM is strictly better off under full disclosure than partial disclosure.
We now turn to the the case where information acquisition is endogenous. To begin,
suppose the DM believes that an adviser with type µ ≥ 0 will choose effort pe. The
following Lemma decomposes the payoff for the adviser from choosing effort p, denoted
UA(p; p
e, B, µ), in a useful manner.13
Lemma 1. The adviser’s expected utility form choosing effort p can be written as
UA(p; p
e, B, µ) = K(B, µ, pe) + p∆(B, µ, pe)− c(p),
where
∆(B, µ, pe) :=
(∫
s/∈S(B,pe)
[
(a∅ (B, pe)− (ρs+B))2 −B2
]
γ (s;µ) ds
)
(6)
and
K(B, µ, pe) := −
∫
(a∅ (B, pe)− (ρs+B))2 γ (s;µ) ds− σ˜2. (7)
The first term in the decomposition, K(·), is the expected utility when a signal is not
observed. Equation (7) expresses this utility by iterating expectations over each possible
13Even though the interim bias B is determined by µ, we write them as separate variables in the funcion
UA(·) to emphasize the two separate effects caused by changes in the difference of opinion: changes in prior
beliefs over signal distributions and changes in the interim bias.
13
value of s, reflecting the fact that the DM takes decision a∅(·) without its disclosure whereas
the adviser’s preferred action if the signal were s is ρs + B, and that σ˜2 is the residual
variance of the state given any signal. The second term in the decomposition, p∆(·), is the
probability of a obtaining a signal multiplied by the expected gain from obtaining a signal.
Equation (6) expresses the expected gain, ∆(·), via iterated expectations over possible
signals. To understand it, note that the adviser’s gain is zero if a signal is not disclosed
(whenever s ∈ S(B, pe)), whereas when a signal is disclosed, the adviser’s utility (gross of
the residual variance) is −B2, because the DM takes decision ρs.
We are now in a position to characterize the adviser’s equilibrium effort level. Given
the DM’s belief, pe, the adviser will choose p to maximize UA(p; p
e, B, µ). By the Inada
conditions on effort costs, this choice is interior and characterized by the first-order condi-
tion:
∂UA(p; p
e, B, µ)
∂p
= ∆(B, µ, pe)− c′(p) = 0.
Equilibrium requires that the DM’s belief be correct, so we must have pe = p. Therefore,
in equilibrium, we must have
∆(B, µ, p) = c′(p). (8)
Lemma 2. For any (B, µ), p is an equilibrium effort choice if and only if p ∈ (0, 1) and
satisfies (8). For any (B, µ), an equilibrium exists.
We cannot rule out that there may be multiple equilibrium effort levels for a given
type of adviser. The reason is that the DM’s action in the event of nondisclosure depends
on adviser’s (expected) effort, and the adviser’s equilibrium effort in turn depends on the
DM’s action upon nondisclosure.14 For the remainder of the paper, for each (B, µ), we
focus on the highest equilibrium effort, denoted p¯(B, µ). This is somewhat analogous to
the standard practice of allowing the DM to select the equilibrium she prefers in principal-
agent models. Since the interim bias B is uniquely determined by B(µ) = (1 − ρ)µ, we
can define the equilibrium probability of information acquisition as a function solely of µ,
p(µ) := p¯(B(µ), µ). The following is a central result of the paper.
Proposition 3. (Incentivizing Effect of Difference of Opinion) An adviser with
a greater difference of opinion acquires information with higher probability: p(µ′) > p(µ) if
|µ′| > |µ|.
14Formally, multiplicity emerges when the function ∆(B,µ, ·) crosses more than once with the strictly
increasing function c′(·) over the domain [0, 1]. As we will discuss more shortly, if signals are public rather
than privately observed by the adviser, there is a unique equilibrium because ∆(B,µ, ·) is constant.
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To elucidate the intuition behind the result, first ignore the strategic disclosure of in-
formation, assuming instead that the outcome of the adviser’s investigation is publicly
observed. In this case, there is no prejudice associated with nondisclosure, so the DM will
choose a∅(B, p) = 0 independent of B or p. It follows from a mean-variance decomposi-
tion that −σ20 − µ2 is the expected utility for the adviser conditional on no signal, and
−σ˜2 − (B(µ))2 is the expected utility conditional on getting a signal. Hence, the adviser’s
marginal benefit of acquiring a signal, denoted Apub(µ), is given by15
∆pub(µ) = σ20 − σ˜2︸ ︷︷ ︸
uncertainty reduction
+ µ2 − (B(µ))2︸ ︷︷ ︸
persuasion
. (9)
Acquiring information benefits the adviser by reducing uncertainty, as shown by the first
term. But moreover, the adviser expects to persuade the DM: without information, the
adviser views the DM’s decision as biased by µ, their ex-ante disagreement in beliefs;
whereas with information, the disagreement is reduced to the interim bias, B(µ) = (1 −
ρ)µ < µ. Since µ2− (B(µ))2 is strictly increasing in |µ|, the persuasion incentive is strictly
larger for an adviser with a greater difference of opinion. This leads to such an adviser
exerting more effort towards information acquisition. A related intuition is that the adviser
expects action ρµ conditional on acquiring information, whereas he knows that action 0 will
be taken without information. Hence, the adviser believes that by acquiring information,
he can persuade the DM to take an action that is closer in expectation to his own prior.16
The benefit of such persuasion is more valuable to an adviser with greater difference of
opinion.
Now consider the case where information is private, and the adviser strategically com-
municates. Suppose the DM expects effort pe from the adviser of type µ. Then he will
choose a∅(B(µ), pe) when a signal is not disclosed. Since the adviser always has the option
to disclose all signals, his marginal benefit of acquiring information and then strategi-
cally disclosing it, as defined by equation (6), is at least as large as the marginal benefit
from (sub-optimally) disclosing all signals, which we shall denote ∆pri(µ, a∅(B(µ), pe)). By
15Alternatively, one can also verify that equation (6) simplifies to equation (9) if the nondisclosure region
S(·) = ∅ and a∅(·) = 0, as is effectively the case under public observation of signal.
16Of course, the DM does not expect to be persuaded: her expectation of her action conditional on a
signal being acquired is 0. Instead, she expects that should a signal is acquired, the adviser’s preferred
decision will shift towards her opinion. This feature that each player expects new information to persuade
the other is also studied by Yildiz (2004) in a bargaining model with heterogeneous priors.
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mean-variance decomposition again, we have
∆(B(µ), µ, pe) ≥ ∆pri(µ, a∅(B(µ), pe))
= σ20 − σ˜2︸ ︷︷ ︸
uncertainty reduction
+ µ2 − (B(µ))2︸ ︷︷ ︸
persuasion
+ (a∅)2 − 2a∅µ︸ ︷︷ ︸
avoiding prejudice
. (10)
Recall from Proposition 1 the prejudicial effect: for any pe > 0 and µ 6= 0, a∅(B(µ), pe)µ <
0. Hence, for any pe > 0 and µ 6= 0, ∆pri(µ, pe) > ∆pub(µ): given that information is
private, the DM’s rational response to the adviser claiming a lack of information affects the
adviser adversely—this is the prejudicial effect—and to avoid such an adverse inference,
the adviser is even more motivated to acquire a signal than when information is public.17
Propositions 1 and 3 identify the tradeoff faced by the DM: an adviser with a greater
difference of opinion exerts more effort, but reveals less of any information he may acquire.
Does the benefit from improved incentives for information acquisition outweigh the loss
from strategic disclosure? We demonstrate below that this is indeed the case for at least
some difference in opinion.
Proposition 4. (Optimality of Difference of Opinion) There exists some µA 6= 0
such that it is strictly better for the DM to appoint an adviser of type µA over a like-minded
adviser.
The optimality of difference of opinion is largely due to the persuasion effect. As the
difference of opinion µ is raised slightly, the persuasion motive it generates creates a non-
negligible benefit in increased information acquisition, whereas the prejudicial effect (which
entails both communication loss and information acquisition gain) is negligible. This can
be seen most clearly when the signal is perfectly informative, ρ = 1. In this case, B(µ) = 0,
so there is full disclosure in the communication stage, analogous to a situation where
information is public; hence, appointing an adviser with difference of opinion is clearly
desirable.18 By continuity, there is a set of ρ’s near 1 for which the adviser of type µ is
17The proof of Proposition 3 in the Appendix shows that the incentive to avoid prejudice combined with
the incentive to persuade leads an adviser with a greater difference of opinion to exert more effort, taking
into account the greater strategic suppression of signals by such an adviser.
18Formally, the DM’s utility from appointing an adviser of type µ when ρ = 1 is
Uρ=1DM (µ) := −σ20(1− p(µ)),
which is simply the ex-ante variance in the state multiplied by the probability of not acquiring a signal,
because when a signal is acquired, there is no residual uncertainty. Proposition 3 implies that for any
µ > 0, Uρ=1DM (µ) > U
ρ=1
DM (0).
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Figure 2: Equilibrium non-disclosure action as a function of adviser’s opinion. Parameters:
c(p) = p
4
(1−p)2 ; σ
2
1 = 2; highest curve corresponds to ρ =
9
10
, middle curve to ρ = 8
9
, and lowest
curve to ρ = 7
8
.
better for the DM than the like-minded adviser. This argument verifies Proposition 4 for
all ρ sufficiently close to 1. The proof in the Appendix shows that for any ρ, however far
from 1, there is some adviser sufficiently near type 0 who is in fact better for the DM than
an adviser of type 0.
Our main results are illustrated in Figures 2 and 3, which show numerical computations
with the specified parameter values.19 Figure 2 illustrates that the nondisclosure action
is decreasing in µ, which happens for two reasons: directly through the prejudicial effect
(holding p fixed, an increase in µ causes a decrease in a∅), and indirectly through the
incentivizing effect, because an adviser with higher µ exerts more effort (when µ > 0),
leading to a higher p, which in turn also causes a decrease in a∅ (when µ > 0) as noted
in Proposition 1. Figure 3 illustrates that the DM never finds it optimal to appoint a
like-minded expert. It also shows that as signals gets more precise (so that information
acquisition is more important to the DM), the DM may prefer to appoint an expert with
greater difference of opinion.
19The figures only show positive values of µ, since there is an obvious symmetry for negative values.
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Figure 3: DM’s utility as a function of adviser’s opinion. Parameters: c(p) = p
4
(1−p)2 ; σ
2
1 = 2;
highest curve corresponds to ρ = 7
8
, middle curve to ρ = 8
9
, and lowest curve to ρ = 9
10
.
5 Opinions and Preferences
We have thus far assumed that the DM and the available pool of advisers all have the same
fundamental preferences, but differ in opinions. This seems reasonable in some circum-
stances, as previously suggested. In this section, we augment the space of types to allow
for fundamental preference conflicts. This allows us to explore a number of issues, such as:
Will the DM benefit from an adviser with different preferences in the same way she will
benefit from one with a different opinion? If an adviser can be chosen from a very rich pool
of advisers differing both in opinions and preferences, how will the DM combine the two
attributes? For instance, for an adviser with a given preference, will she prefer him to be a
skeptic—one who doubts that discovering the state of the world will shift the DM’s action
in the direction of his preferences bias—or a zealot—one who believes that his preference
will be also be “vindicated by the evidence.”
To begin, suppose, as is standard in the literature, a player’s preferences are indexed
by a single bias parameter b ∈ [b, b], with b < 0 < b, such that his state-dependent von
Neumann-Morgenstern utility is
u(a, ω, b) = −(a− ω − b)2.
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The adviser therefore now has a two-dimensional type (that is common knowledge), (b, µ).
The DM’s type is normalized as (0, 0).
Interim but not ex-ante equivalence. Similar to earlier analysis, it is straightforward
that an adviser of type (b, µ) desires the action α(s|b, µ) := ρs + (1− ρ)µ + b when signal
s is observed. Hence, such an adviser has an interim bias of B(b, µ) := (1 − ρ)µ + b.
This immediately suggests the interchangeability of the two kinds of biases—preferences
and opinions—in the disclosure sub-game. For any adviser with opinion bias µ and no
preference bias, there exists an adviser with only preference bias b = (1−ρ)µ such that the
latter will have precisely the same incentives to disclose the signal as the former. Formally,
given the same effort level, the disclosure sub-game equilibrium played by the DM and
either adviser is the same.
This isomorphism does not extend to the information acquisition stage. To see this,
start with an adviser of type (0, µ), i.e., with opinion bias µ but no preference bias. When
such an adviser does not acquire a signal, he expects the DM to make a decision that is
distorted by at least µ from what he regards as the right decision.20 Consider now an adviser
of type (µ, 0), i.e., with preference bias b = µ and no opinion bias. This adviser also believes
that, absent disclosure of a signal, the DM will choose an action that is at least µ away from
his most preferred decision. Crucially, however, their expected payoffs from disclosing a
signal are quite different. The former type (opinion-biased adviser) believes that the signal
will vindicate his prior and thus bring the DM closer toward his ex-ante preferred decision;
whereas the latter type (preference-biased adviser) has no such expectation. One concludes
that the persuasion motive does not exist for an adviser biased in preferences alone.
Publicly observed signal. To see how the two types of biases can interact in affecting
the incentive for information acquisition, it is useful to first consider the case where the
adviser’s signal (or lack thereof) is publicly observed. This case allows us focus on some
of the issues more simply, because there is no strategic withholding of information. Fix
any adviser of type (b, µ). If no signal is observed, the DM takes action 0, while the the
adviser prefers the action b+ µ. Hence, the adviser has expected utility −σ20 − (b+ µ)2. If
signal s is observed, then the DM takes action ρs, even though the adviser prefer action
ρs + B(b, µ); so the adviser has expected utility −σ˜2 − (B(b, µ))2. The adviser’s expected
20“At least,” because the prejudicial effect will cause the DM to take an action even lower than 0, unless
information is public or signals are perfectly-informative.
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gain from acquiring information is, therefore,
∆pub(b, µ) = σ20 − σ˜2︸ ︷︷ ︸
uncertainty reduction
+
(
2ρ− ρ2)µ2︸ ︷︷ ︸
persuasion
+ (1 + ρ) bµ.︸ ︷︷ ︸
reinforcement
(11)
Suppose first µ = 0, so the adviser is like-minded. In this case, ∆pub(b, 0) is independent of
b. That is, the incentive for a like-minded adviser to acquire information does not depend
on his preference, and consequently, there is no benefit to appointing an adviser who differs
only in preference. This stands in stark contrast to the case of difference of opinion, (0, µ),
µ 6= 0, where equation (9) showed that advisers with greater difference of opinion have
bigger marginal benefits of acquiring information, and are therefore strictly better for the
DM under public information. This clearly shows the distinction between preferences and
opinions.
Now suppose µ 6= 0. Then, the persuasion effect appears, as is captured by the second
term of (11). More interestingly, the adviser’s preference also matters now, and in fact
interacts with the opinion bias. Specifically, a positive opinion bias is reinforced by a
positive preference bias, whereas it is counteracted by a negative preference bias ; this effect
manifests itself as the third term in (11). The intuition turns on the concavity of the
adviser’s payoff function, and can be seen as follows. Without a signal, the adviser’s
optimal action is away from the DM’s action by |b+ µ|. Concavity implies that the bigger
is |b + µ|, the greater the utility gain for the adviser when he expects to move the DM’s
action in the direction of his ex-ante bias. Therefore, when µ > 0, say, an adviser with b > 0
has a greater incentive to acquire information than an adviser with b < 0. In fact, if b were
sufficiently negative relative to µ > 0, the adviser may not want to acquire information at
all, because he expects it to shift the DM’s decision away from his net bias of b+ µ.
Privately observed signal. When the signal is observed privately by the adviser, the
prejudicial motive is added to the adviser’s incentive for information acquisition. The next
proposition states an incentivizing effect of both preference and opinion biases. Extending
our previous notation, we use p(B, µ) to denote the highest equilibrium effort choice of an
adviser with interim bias B and prior µ.
Proposition 5. Suppose (|B(b, µ)|, |µ|) < (|B(b′, µ′)|, |µ′|) and B(b′, µ′)µ′ ≥ 0.21 Then,
p(B(b′, µ′), µ′) > p(B(b, µ), µ).
21We follow the convention that (x, y) < (x′, y′) if x ≤ x′ and y ≤ y′, with at least one strict inequality.
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Figure 4: DM’s utility as a function of adviser’s preference. Parameters: c(p) = p
2
1−p , σ
2
1 = 1,
σ20 = 0.5.
Proposition 5 nests Proposition 3 as a special case with b = b′ = 0. Setting µ = µ′ = 0
gives the other special case in which the adviser differs from the DM only in preference.
Unlike under public information, a preference bias alone creates incentives for information
acquisition when the outcome of the adviser’s experiment is private. The reason is that
an adviser exerts additional effort to avoid the prejudicial inference the DM attaches to
nondisclosure. Of course, from the DM’s point of view, this incentive benefit is offset by the
loss associated with strategic withholding of information. It turns out that these opposing
effects are of the same magnitude locally when |b| ≈ 0. Hence, a difference of preference
is not unambiguously beneficial to DM in the way that difference of opinion is. Indeed,
a numerical example shows that the DM’s utility is decreasing in |b| around b = 0, but
interestingly, starts increasing when |b| becomes sufficiently large, to the point where it can
rise above the utility associated with type b = 0. This is shown in Figure 4. In such cases,
the DM never prefers an adviser with preference bias unless the bias is sufficiently large,
contrasting with difference of opinion. This difference may matter if the space of available
adviser types is not sufficiently large (such as b < 1.4 in the example plotted in Figure 4).
More generally, Proposition 5 shows how the two types of biases interact with respect
to the incentive for information acquisition. The following corollaries record the nature of
the interaction.
Corollary 1. (Complementarity of opinion and preference) If (b′, µ′) > (b, µ) ≥
21
0, then an adviser with (b′, µ′) choose a higher effort than one with (b, µ).
Thus, in the domain (b, µ) ∈ R2+, an increase in either kind of bias—preference or
opinion—leads to greater information acquisition.
Corollary 2. (Zealot vs. skeptic) Suppose an adviser has type (b, µ) such that
B(b, µ) ≥ 0 but that µ < 0. Replacing the adviser with one of type (b,−µ) leads to a higher
effort.
An adviser of type (b, µ) with B(b, µ) ≥ 0 but µ < 0 likes actions higher than the DM
would like if the state of the world were publicly known, yet he is a priori pessimistic about
obtaining a signal that will shift the DM’s action upward. In this sense, he is a skeptic, and
does not have a strong incentive for information acquisition. Replacing him with a zealot
who believes that information about the state will in fact lead the DM to take a higher
action leads to more information acquisition.
The final corollary shows that having access to a rich pool of advisers on both opinion
and preference dimensions endows the DM with enough degree of freedom to eliminate
disclosure loss altogether, and yet use the adviser’s type as an incentive instrument.
Corollary 3. (Optimal type) If B(b, µ) = B(b′, µ′) ≥ 0 and µ′ > µ ≥ 0, then the
adviser with (b′, µ′) chooses a higher effort than the one with (b, µ). Moreover, the DM
strictly prefers appointing the former. In particular, if one raises µ and lowers b so as to
maintain B(b, µ) = 0, then an higher effort is induced while maintaining full disclosure.
Choosing an adviser who has opinion µ > 0 but negative preference bias b = −(1− ρ)µ
eliminates interim bias altogether, and thus avoids any strategic withholding of information.
If this can be done without any constraints, the DM can raise µ unboundedly and increase
his expected utility. However, since the space of types is assumed to be bounded, it may
be optimal for the DM to choose an expert with an interim bias B(b, µ) > 0, as was the
case when advisers are differentiated by opinions alone.
6 Discussion
In this section, we discuss some other issues that can be raised in our framework. For
simplicity, we return to the baseline setting where individuals are only distinguished by
their opinions, sharing the same fundamental preferences.
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6.1 Delegation
An important issue in various organizations is the choice between delegation and commu-
nication.22 One prominent view is that delegation of decision-making authority to an agent
increases his incentives to become informed about the decision problem if he can extract a
greater fraction of the surplus from information gathering, but is costly to the DM insofar
as the agent’s actions when given authority do not maximize the DM’s interests. Aghion
and Tirole (1997) label this the “initiative” versus “loss of control” tradeoff.
Delegation involves a costly loss of control in our model as well when the adviser has a
different opinion. This is because the decision taken by such an adviser will not coincide
with the DM’s preferred action, regardless of whether a signal is observed or not. But in
addition, delegation also fails to harness the incentive benefits associated with difference
of opinion under communication. The reason is that the adviser, in possession of decision-
making authority, has no incentive to acquire information to either persuade the DM or to
avoid prejudice. Regardless of his opinion, an adviser would acquire information solely to
reduce uncertainty about the state. This implies that if the DM must delegate, she would
strictly prefer to choose a like-minded adviser, thereby avoiding costly loss of control.
Notice, however, that delegation and communication are equivalent when the adviser is
like-minded (since there is no ex-ante nor interim bias). Our earlier results shows that the
DM would strictly prefer to communicate, instead, with an appropriately chosen adviser.
We summarize with the following result:
Proposition 6. Under delegation, it is uniquely optimal for the DM to choose a like-
minded adviser. However such an arrangement is strictly worse for the DM than retaining
authority and choosing an appropriate adviser with a difference of opinion.
6.2 Heterogeneity in Confidence
Suppose that rather than being differentiated by prior mean, all advisers have the same
prior mean as the DM (µ = 0), but they differ in confidence in their ability, represented by
beliefs about their signal precision. It is convenient to map signal precision into the weight
22Our interest here concerns situations where there is an information acquisition problem, but Dessein
(2002) shows that the question is subtle even when information is exogenous. Also, we only consider the two
extremes: full delegation and no delegation, ignoring constrained delegation. A standard justification is that
of incomplete contracting. Szalay (2005) analyzes a related mechanism design problem with commitment,
but our setting differs because of verifiable information and because differences of opinion induce interim
bias.
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the posterior mean places on signal versus prior mean, as before. That is, if an adviser
believes his signal has variance σ21, we represent him via ρ(σ
2
1) :=
σ20
σ20+σ
2
1
.23 The DM has
ρDM ∈ (0, 1), and she can choose an adviser with any ρA ∈ [0, 1]. Interpreting ρDM as
a baseline, an adviser with ρA > ρDM is overconfident of his ability and an adviser with
ρA < ρDM is underconfident.
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The preferred action for an adviser of type ρA who observes signal s is ρAs, whereas the
DM would take action ρDMs if the signal is disclosed. Hence, any adviser with ρA 6= ρDM has
a conflict of interest in the disclosure sub-game. Surprisingly however, so long as ρA ≥ ρDM ,
there is an equilibrium in the disclosure sub-game that fully reveals the outcome of the
adviser’s investigation, for any effort choice. To see this, notice that if the DM believes
the adviser never withholds his signal, he optimally plays a∅ = 0. It is then optimal for
the adviser to disclose any signal he acquires because |ρAs| ≥ |ρDMs| for all s (with strict
inequality when s 6= 0 and ρA > ρDM).25
We can show that the incentives to acquire information are strictly higher the more
overconfident an adviser is. The intuition is that he believes the value of a signal is larger,
and hence perceives a larger marginal benefit of effort, even after accounting for the fact
that the DM’s decision does not respond to a signal as much as he would like. Therefore,
among overconfident advisers, the DM strictly prefers one with ρA = 1. In the proof of the
following result, we establish that an underconfident adviser is never optimal either.
Proposition 7. If advisers are distinguished only by confidence, ρA, the DM uniquely
prefers to appoint a maximally overconfident adviser, i.e. one with ρA = 1 who believes
that his signal is perfectly informative.
7 Related Literature
Formally, our model builds upon a Sender-Receiver costless signaling game of verifiable
information, first studied by Grossman (1981) and Milgrom (1981). The “unraveling” phe-
23This makes it clear that the subsequent analysis can also be applied to differences in beliefs about the
variance of the prior distribution of state of the world.
24Admati and Pfleiderer (2004) and Kawamura (2007) analyze cheap talk games with an
over/underconfident Sender. Information acquisition is not endogenous in either paper.
25If there is any other equilibrium in the disclosure sub-game, we assume the fully revealing one is played.
Aside from being intuitively focal and simple, it is the only disclosure equilibrium that is “renegotiation
proof” at the point where effort has been exerted but investigation outcome not yet observed (regardless
of how much effort has/is believed to have been exerted).
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nomenon noted by these authors does not arise here because the Sender (adviser) may not
possess information, as pointed out by Shin (1994, 1998), among others. This literature
typically assumes that independent of his information, the Sender’s utility is strictly mono-
tone in the Receiver’s decision. In contrast, at the communication stage of our model, the
interim preferences—owing to difference of opinion—take the non-monotone form of “finite
bias” used in the cheap talk (soft or unverifiable information) literature following Crawford
and Sobel (1982).
The idea that differences of opinion induce interim conflicts, in turn entailing commu-
nication loss, is not surprising. In most models of strategic communication with exogenous
information, if the DM were permitted to choose the type of adviser she communicates with,
she would choose an adviser who shares her interim preferences (Suen, 2004, explictly dis-
cusses this point).26 Our point of departure is to endogenize the acquisition of information.
While previous authors have incorporated this factor (e.g. Matthews and Postlewaite, 1985;
Shavell, 1994), there is little work studying the tradeoff between information acquisition
and transmission, and how this is affected by the degree of conflict.
A few exceptions are authors who have recently developed similar themes independently.
Dur and Swank (2005) find it optimal for a DM to sometimes choose an adviser of a
different preference type from herself, even though communication with such an adviser is
less effective than with an adviser of the same type. In a related vein, Gerardi and Yariv
(2007a) show, in a jury model with binary decisions and public information, that appointing
a juror with a different preference (in terms of the threshold of reasonable doubt) from the
DM can be beneficial. Despite the resemblance of these findings to ours, the underlying
rationales are distinct, formally due to the binary decision space in the aforementioned
papers. The main idea of Dur and Swank (2005) is the benefit of having an adviser who is
more open-minded or less extreme than the DM, rather than one with difference of opinion
from DM—the focus of the current work. Indeed, if the DM in their model is ex-ante
unbiased between the two available decision alternatives, it is optimal for her to appoint
an adviser of the same type; in our continuous model, this is never the case. Likewise,
the incentive effect of a preference-biased juror in Gerardi and Yariv (2007a) stems from
the binary decision space: facing the unfavorable status quo, a biased adviser can only
gain from the new information which will either reinforce the status quo or, with luck,
26This is also true in models with multiple advisers, such as Krishna and Morgan (2001) and Li and
Suen (2004).
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shift the DM’s decision to the favored alternative.27 With non-binary decisions, however,
new information can lead to a decision that is less favorable than the status quo. In fact,
without a restriction on the decision space, new information does not shift the decision
on average when the conflict is one of preferences alone. Consequently, as was shown in
Section 5, a preference conflict alone with public information cannot motivate information
acquisition when the decision is continuous. As such, the persuasion and prejudicial effects
we have identified have no counterparts in these papers.
Van den Steen (2004) does find a persuasion incentive stemming from difference of opin-
ion.28 His model differs from ours, however, in a number of ways; for example he assumes
both binary information and decisions. Substantively, he does not study the prejudicial ef-
fect and its implications for information acquisition when information is privately observed
by the adviser. There is, therefore, no analog of our finding that some difference of opin-
ion is optimal for the DM even accounting for the cost of strategic disclosure. The above
papers and ours are best seen complementary, developing related but distinct insights, and
focusing on different issues.29
The optimality of having an adviser whose interim preferences are different from the
DM’s is also reminiscent of Dewatripont and Tirole (1999), but the frameworks and forces
at work are quite different. They study the optimality of giving monetary rewards for “ad-
vocacy” from agents when the central problem is that of multitasking between conflicting
tasks. In contrast, the effects in our model are derived solely from a single effort choice.
Finally, the current paper is consistent with the emerging theme that ex-post suboptimal
mechanisms are sometimes ex-ante optimal because they can provide greater incentives
for agents to acquire information. Examples in settings related to ours are Li (2001) and
Szalay (2005).30 Although we are interested in environments where contracting is essentially
27A related point is made by Hori (2006) who considers an agent hired to advise a principal on the
adoption of a new project. The cost of providing incentives for information acquisition may be lower for
an agent who is biased toward adoption, if the project is a priori unlikely to be profitable (in which case
an unbiased agent may simply recommend non-adoption without learning about the project).
28This was brought to our attention after the first draft of our paper was complete; we thank Eric Van
den Steen.
29For instance, Van den Steen (2004) also discusses coordination between individual action choices, and
Gerardi and Yariv (2007a) consider multiple jurors and sequential consultation. Meanwhile, we consider
private information and the distinction/interaction between opinion and preferences. We should also note
the less directly related work of Cai (2004), who develops a model with an endogenously chosen number of
advisers who strategically acquire and transmit information. In his environment advisers are assumed to
be ex-ante unbiased, instead only discovering their biases if they choose to acquire information about the
decision problem.
30Examples in other environments include Bergemann and Valimaki (2002), Gerardi and Yariv (2007b),
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infeasible, our results can be seen in the similar light. It is important to stress, however,
that ex post suboptimality is not the only reason that it is ex ante optimal for the DM to
appoint an adviser with a difference of opinion: even if signals are public when acquired—in
which case the DM always takes an optimal decision given the adviser’s information—an
adviser who has a larger difference of opinion with the DM has a greater incentive to acquire
information, because of the persuasion motive.
8 Concluding Remarks
This paper has introduced a novel model to study the costs and benefits of difference of
opinion from an incentive point of view. Our main findings are threefold. First, because
difference of opinion leads to interim conflict of interest even when fundamental preferences
agree, it leads to a loss in information transmission via strategic disclosure. This leads to
a prejudicial effect against an adviser who has a difference of opinion unless he provides
information. Second, difference of opinion increases the incentives for an adviser to exert
costly effort towards information acquisition. This is for two reasons: a motive to avoid the
prejudicial inference associated with nondisclosure, and a belief that he can systematically
shift the decision maker’s action in the direction of his opinion by acquiring information (the
persuasion motive). Third, the decision maker optimally resolves the tradeoff by appointing
an adviser who has at least some difference of opinion with her.
We have discussed various other issues, including the relationship between opinions and
preferences, their interaction, and questions about delegation and confidence. We conclude
by discussing some of our modeling assumptions, and some avenues for future research.
Equilibrium and rationality assumptions. Dekel, Fudenberg, and Levine (2004) have
pointed out that justifications for equilibrium as a steady state of a learning process are
more tenuous than usual under heterogenous priors.31 Although it beyond our scope to
consider non-equilibrium (or weaker equilibrium) analysis of our model, we wish to empha-
size the following points: first, the prejudicial effect exists whether interim conflicts stem
from different priors or preferences; second, the persuasion effect, which is the key novel
implication of heterogenous priors, does not depend in any essential way on a sophisticated
and Gershkov and Szentes (2004).
31As they emphasize, their argument is not against heterogeneous priors per se, but rather learning
justifications for equilibrium in such settings.
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equilibrium notion. Specifically, as already noted, the persuasion effect exists even if the
adviser’s choice of effort and outcome of his experiment were publicly observed. In this
case, the game is one of perfect and complete information, so that correct beliefs about the
other player’s strategy requires only a few iterations of knowledge of rationality.
The nature of effort. We have assumed that effort is success-enhancing in the sense of
increasing the probability of observing an informative signal about the state. Alternatively,
one could assume that there is a fixed probability with which the adviser observes a signal,
but higher effort increases the precision of the observed signal. We believe our insights
would extend to this setting. The incentivizing effect of difference of opinion and non-
optimality of a like-minded expert certainly hold when the signal is publicly observed,
because in this case there is no disclosure loss, and an adviser with a more extreme opinion
has more to gain by producing a more precise signal.
Social Welfare. Our focus has been entirely on the DM’s optimal choice of adviser.
One could, instead, discuss the issue of social welfare in our model. It is clear how to
evaluate welfare under full information about the state, since all individuals have the same
fundamental preferences. More difficult, however, is the question of what the “right” prior is
for a social planner (SP), and also how cost of effort from the adviser should be incorporated.
Various possibilities can be accommodated by considering a social planner who has his own
prior mean, µSP , and the following social welfare function:
uSP (a, ω, e) = −k(a− ω)2 − c(e),
where k ≥ 1 is the weight placed on correct decision-making relative to effort cost. One can
think of k as reflecting the number of people affected by the decision problem at hand. As
k →∞, the effort cost is essentially ignored by the SP. This may be justified for example
if the decision is about a new medicinal drug and the unknown state is the possible side
effects the drug may have (cf. Persico, 2004). On the other hand, if the decision affects only
a small number of people—perhaps just the DM and adviser—then the effort cost plays a
significant role in the social calculus.
With this formulation, it is natural to ask what kind of adviser the SP would choose if
the adviser were communicating directly with the SP. So long as k 6= 1, our main insights
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would apply: in particular, that the SP would not choose a like-minded adviser.32
Monetary payments. We have completely abstracted from monetary transfers alto-
gether. In many applications, this seems reasonable, for example if a leader is choosing
amongst current members of her organization to investigate some issue, or the wage for an
outside adviser is exogenously fixed as far as the DM is concerned, and richer contracts are
not feasible. A first step towards relaxing this would be to require the DM to make a fixed
payment that will induce the adviser’s ex-ante participation. While the full extension is
beyond our current scope, we believe that our main points would carry over to this setting.
Intuitively, the DM in this case maximizes some weighted average of her payoff and the
adviser’s payoff, with the weight on the adviser’s payoff corresponding to the shadow value
on the individual rationality constraint. This is similar to the treatment of “social welfare”
above, with a planner who shares the DM’s prior.
Extremism and bounded action space. The set of feasible decisions in our model is
R. If, instead, the decision space were restricted, to, say, a compact interval symmetric
around 0, we would have an additional effect: a more extreme adviser (in terms of opinion
or preference) would place less direct value on acquiring information than a less extreme
adviser (cf. Dur and Swank, 2005). Intuitively, this is because with a restricted decision
space, it is unlikely that information will “change the mind” of an extreme adviser. This
would introduce another element to the calculus of difference of opinion that may be worthy
of further examination. While this would generally make the optimal adviser less extreme
than in the current setting, there would still be a gain from appointing an adviser with
some of difference of opinion.
The nature of information. We have treated information as hard or verifiable. Aside
from the technical tractability this offers, the assumption seems appropriate in various
applications. On the other hand, there are some situations where information may be
soft or unverifiable. Although a full analysis is left to future research, we can offer some
observations. It is important to distinguish between two possibilities here.
32If k = 1, it is straightforward to see that the SP would choose a like-minded adviser, because such
an adviser reveals information perfectly, and chooses effort to solve the first best when k = 1. However,
this obviously relies upon the adviser fully internalizing the social tradeoff between effort and quality of
decisions.
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First, as in Austen-Smith (1994), suppose that the adviser can prove that he has ac-
quired a signal, but statements about what the signal is are cheap talk. Our main insights
appear to extend to this setting, subject to the caveat of multiple equilibria in the commu-
nication stage owing to the usual difficulties with cheap talk. In particular, when signals are
perfectly revealing of the state, there is an equilibrium in the communication game where
the adviser (regardless of his opinion) reveals whether he is informed or not, and if in-
formed, perfectly reveals his signal. Loosely, this is the “most informative” communication
equilibrium. Given its selection, a greater difference of opinion leads to greater informa-
tion acquisition, because of the persuasion motive, while there is no information loss from
communication. By continuity, some difference of opinion will be optimal when signals are
close to perfect, even though there is a loss of information from strategic communication
in this case.
On the other hand, if the adviser cannot even prove that he has acquired a signal, so
that all statements are cheap talk, the incentivizing effects of differences of opinion may be
significantly mitigated. Intuitively, the persuasion motive from difference of opinion creates
incentives because the adviser believes that by exerting more effort, he creates the ability
to systematically shift the DM’s action in his desired direction. Under complete cheap talk,
effort does not affect the set of claims the adviser can make, casting doubt on whether the
incentivizing effect exists.
Multiple advisers. We have studied a setting where a single adviser must be chosen.
Decision makers sometimes consult more than one adviser, for instance, by forming a
committee of advisers. Multiple advisers raise new issues both in terms of possible free
riding amongst the advisers and the DM’s response in committee design. We conjecture
that the main thrust of our paper—the optimality of appointing advisers who differ in
opinions from the DM—would extend to such a setting. A particularly interesting question
is whether the optimal committee should consist of congruent or opposing agents, i.e. agents
whose opinions are on the same side relative to the DM, or on opposite sides. We hope to
address this in subsequent work.
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A Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: By assumption, p < 1. Without loss, we assume B ≥ 0. A
symmetric argument will establish the result for the opposite case of B < 0. We start by
deriving an equation whose solution will constitute the equilibrium condition (5). First, it
follows from (5) that
a∅ (B, p) = aN (p, [s (B, p) , s (B, p)]) .
Substituting in from (2), (3), and (4) gives the main equation:
s (B, p) =
p
p
∫ s(B,p)
s(B,p)− 2B
ρ
γ (s; 0) ds+ 1− p
∫ s(B,p)
s(B,p)− 2B
ρ
sγ (s; 0) ds. (12)
We will show that there is a unique solution to (12) in two steps below; this implies that
is a unique disclosure equilibrium.
Step 1. For any p, s (0, p) = s(0, p) = a∅(0, p) = 0.
Proof: Immediate from the observation that l (0, a) = h (a), and aN (p, S) = 0 if S
has measure 0. ‖
Step 2. For any (B, p), there is a unique equilibrium in the disclosure game.
Proof: Step 1 proves the result for B = 0, so we need only that show that there is a
unique solution to (12) when B > 0. This latter is accomplished by showing that there is
a unique solution to
Υ (s;B, p) := −p
∫ s
s− 2B
ρ
(s− s) γ (s; 0) ds− s (1− p) = 0. (13)
Without loss of generality, we can restrict attention to s < 0, because there is no
solution to (13) with s ≥ 0 when B > 0. To see that there is at least one solution, apply
the intermediate value theorem with the following observations: Υ (s;B, p) is continuous
in s, and satisfies Υ (0;B, p) < 0 and Υ (s;B, p)→∞ as s → −∞ (because the integral in
(13) is positive and bounded above by 4(B
ρ
)2, and p < 1).
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To prove uniqueness, observe
∂
∂s
Υ(s;B, p) = p
(
1 + 2(B/ρ)γ (s− 2(B/ρ); 0)−
∫ s
s−2(B/ρ)
γ (s; 0) ds
)
− 1
< p
(
1 + 2(B/ρ)γ (s− 2(B/ρ); 0)−
∫ s
s−2(B/ρ)
γ (s− 2(B/ρ); 0) ds
)
− 1
= p− 1 ≤ 0,
where the inequality uses the fact that γ (·; 0) is strictly increasing on the negative Reals.
Consequently, there can only be one solution to (13). ‖
The comparative statics results are established in several steps again for the case B ≥ 0
(with the symmetric argument applicable for the opposite case B < 0).
Step 3. For any (B, p) >> (0, 0), ∂
∂B
s(B, p) < 0.
Proof: We showed earlier that ∂
∂s
Υ(s;B, p) < 0. We also have
∂
∂B
Υ(s, B, p) = −4Bp
ρ2
γ (s− 2(B/ρ); 0) < 0.
By the implicit function theorem,
∂s (B, p)
∂B
= −
∂Υ(s(B,p);B,p)
∂B
∂Υ(s(B,p);B,p)
∂s
< (=)0,
(if B = 0). ‖
Step 4. For any B ≥ 0, p > 0, ∂
∂B
s(B, p) < 0.
Proof: The result follows from Step 3, upon noting that s(B, p) = s(B, p)− 2B
ρ
. ‖
Step 5. For any p > 0, ∂
∂p
s(B, p) < (=) 0 if B > (=) 0; and ∂
∂p
s(B, p) < (=) 0 if B > (=) 0.
Proof: We showed earlier that ∂
∂s
Υ(s;B, p) < 0. We also have
∂
∂p
Υ(s;B, p) = −
∫ s
s−2(B/ρ)
(s− s) γ (s; 0) ds+ s.
By the implicit function theorem, ∂s(B,p)
∂p
= −
∂Υ(s(B,p);B,p)
∂p
∂Υ(s(B,p);B,p)
∂s
. The first statement is proven
by noting that s(0, p) = 0 and that, for any B > 0, s(B, p) ≤ 0. The second statement
follows from the first statement, since s(B, p) = s(B, p)− 2B
ρ
. ‖
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Step 6. The nondisclosure action a∅(B, p) is zero if B = 0 or p = 0, is strictly decreasing
in B for p > 0, and is strictly decreasing (increasing) in p if B > 0 (if B < 0).
Proof: The result follows from inspection of (4), combined with the preceding Steps.
‖
Proof of Lemma 1: The adviser’s expected payoff from choosing p given the DM’s belief
pe is given by:
UA(p; p
e, B, µ) = p
[
Es 6∈S(B,pe) [Eω[u1(α0(s), ω) | s, µ] | µ] + Es∈S(B,pe) [Eω[u1(a∅(B, pe), ω)|s, µ] | µ]
]
+(1− p)Eω[u1(a∅(B, pe), ω)|µ]− c(p).
The first term decomposes the adviser’s payoff when he obtains the signal (with probability
p): he reveals the signal if s 6∈ S(B, pe), which leads to the action α0(s) by the DM; and
he withholds the signal when s ∈ S(B, pe), which leads to the action a∅(B, pe) by the DM.
The second term is the payoff when the adviser does not observe the signal (which arises
with probability 1− p), in which case the DM picks a∅(B, pe). The last term is the cost of
information acquisition.
The conclusion of the Lemma follows from manipulating terms:
UA(p; p
e, B, µ)
= p
[
Es 6∈S(B,pe) [Eω[u1(α0(s), ω) | s, µ] | µ] + Es∈S(B,pe) [Eω[u1(a∅(B; pe), ω)|s, µ] | µ]
]
+(1− p)Eω[u1(a∅(B; pe), ω)|µ]− c(p)
= p
(
Es 6∈S(B,pe) [Eω[u1(α0(s), ω) | s, µ] | µ] + Es∈S(B,pe) [Eω[u1(a∅(B; pe), ω)|s, µ] | µ]
)
+(1− p)Es[Eω[u1(a∅(B; pe), ω)|s, µ]]− c(p)
= p
(
Es 6∈S(B,pe) [Eω[u1(α0(s), ω)− u1(a∅(B; pe), ω) | s, µ] | µ]
)
+Es [Eω[u1(a∅(B; pe), ω)|s, µ] | µ]− c(p)
= p
(∫
s/∈S(B,pe)
[
(a∅ (B, pe)− ρs−B)2 −B2
]
γ (s;µ) ds
)
−
∫
(a∅ (B, pe)− (ρs+B))2 γ (s;µ) ds− σ˜2 − c(p),
where the last expression is obtained from substituting (1).
Proof of Lemma 2: By Proposition 1, there is full disclosure when pe = 0, hence we
evaluate ∆(B, µ, 0) = σ20 + 2ρB > 0 from (6). For any (B, µ), ∆(B, µ, ·) is a bounded
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mapping. Therefore, by the Inada conditions, we have c′(0) = 0 < ∆(B, µ, 0) and c′(p) >
∆(B, µ, 1) for large enough p. Since both sides of (8) are continuous in p, there exists
p ∈ (0, 1) that satisfies (8). It also follows that any equilibrium p must be interior, so it
must satisfy (8). Finally, if p satisfies (8), we have
∂UA(p˜; p,B, µ)
∂p˜
= ∆(B, µ, p)− c′(p˜) >=
<
0 if p˜
<
=
>
p,
due to the convexity of c(·), so p is an equilibrium effort choice.
Proof of Proposition 3: This is a special case of Proposition 5.
Proof of Proposition 4: Let U (µ) be the expected utility for the DM of appointing an
adviser of prior µ. We can then write
U(µ) := p(µ)W (µ) + (1− p(µ))V (µ),
where
W (µ) : = w(µ, p (µ))
V (µ) : = v(µ, p (µ)),
where
w(µ, p) := −σ˜2 −
∫ s(B(µ),p)
s(B(µ),p)
(a∅(B(µ), p)− sρ)2 γ(s; 0)ds,
and
v(µ, p) := −σ˜2 −
∫ ∞
−∞
(a∅(B(µ), p)− sρ)2 γ(s; 0)ds.
We shall prove that U ′(0) = 0 but the right second derivative of U(µ) evaluated at µ = 0,
denoted U ′′(0+) is strictly positive.33 This will mean that the DM prefers an adviser with
some µ > 0 to an adviser with µ = 0.
Step 1. p′′(0) > p′(0) = 0.
Proof: Rewrite the equilibrium condition (8) for the adviser’s effort choice as:
A(µ, p(µ)) = c′(p(µ)), (14)
33A symmetric argument will prove that the left second derivative of U at µ = 0 is strictly negative.
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where A(µ, p) := ∆(B(µ), µ, p). Observe first
A(µ, p) =
∫
s 6∈S(B(µ),p)
ρ(s− s(B(µ), p)) (2(1− ρ)µ+ ρ(s− s(B(µ), p))) γ(s;µ)ds
= 2µσ˜4
∫
s 6∈S(B(µ),p)
(s− s(B(µ), p))γ(s;µ)ds
+ρ2
∫
s 6∈S(B(µ),p)
(s− s(B(µ), p))2γ(s;µ)ds. (15)
A straightforward, but tedious, calculation yields
A11(0, p) > A1(0, p) = A2(0, p) = 0, (16)
where Ai denotes a partial derivative of A with respect to i-th variable, for i = 1, 2, and
Aij denotes a second order derivative with respect to i and j-th variables for i, j = 1, 2.
Totally differentiating (14) with respect to µ evaluating it at µ = 0, we obtain
p′(0) =
A1(0, p (0))
c′′(p(0))−A2 (0, p (0)) .
It then follows from (16) that p′(0) = 0. Now, totally differentiate (14) twice, and evaluate
the outcome using p′(0) = 0. We then obtain
p′′(0) =
A11(0, p (0))
c′′(p(0))−A2 (0, p (0)) −
(p′(0))2 c′′′(p(0))
c′′(p(0))
+
p′ (0)
c′′ (p (0))
[2A12 (0, p (0)) +A22 (0, p (0))]
=
A11(0)
c′′(p(0))
> 0. ‖
Step 2. W (0)− V (0) > 0 and W ′(0) = V ′(0) = W ′′(0) = V ′′(0) = 0.
Proof: Recall B(0) = 0 and from Proposition 1 that s(0, p) = s(0, p) = 0. Hence, for
any p,
w(0, p)− v(0, p) =
∫ ∞
−∞
(
a∅(0, p)− sσ
2
0
σ2
)2
γ(s; 0)ds > 0,
from which it follows that W (0)− V (0) > 0. For any p, direct computation yields
v1 (0, p) = v2 (0, p) = v11 (0, p) = w1 (0, p) = w2 (0, p) = w11 (0, p) = 0. (17)
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It then follows from (17) and Step 1 that
W ′ (0) = w1(0, p (0)) + p′ (0)w2 (0, p (0)) = 0,
V ′ (0) = v1(0, p (0)) + p′ (0) v2 (0, p (0)) = 0,
W ′′ (0) = w11(0, p (0)) + w12 (0, p (0)) p′ (0)
+p′ (0) (w12 (0, p (0)) + w22 (0, p (0)) p′ (0)) + p′′ (0)w2 (0, p (0))
= 0,
and
V ′′ (0) = v11(0, p (0)) + v12 (0, p (0)) p′ (0)
+p′ (0) (v12 (0, p (0)) + v22 (0, p (0)) p′ (0)) + p′′ (0) v2 (0, p (0))
= 0. ‖
From Step 1 and Step 2, we obtain
U ′(0+) = p′(0)(W (0)− V (0)) + p(0)W ′(0) + (1− p(0))V ′(0) = 0,
and
U ′′(0+) = p′′(0)(W (0)− V (0)) + 2p′(0)(W ′(0)− V ′(0)) + p(0)W ′′(0) + (1− p(0))V ′′(0)
= p′′(0)(W (0)− V (0)) > 0.
Combined, U ′(0+) = 0 and U ′′(0+) > 0 imply that there exists µ > 0 such that U(µ) >
U(0).
Proof of Proposition 5: Consider any pair (B, µ) and (B′, µ′) satisfying the hypothesized
condition. It is without loss to assume B′ ≥ 0 and µ′ ≥ 0. Further, since (B(b, µ), µ) and
(B(−b,−µ),−µ) are payoff equivalent and thus generate the same incentive for the adviser,
it is without loss to assume µ ≥ 0. The condition then reduces to (0, 0) ≤ (|B|, µ) < (B′, µ′).
We focus on the case in which B ≥ 0. As we will argue later, the case of B < 0 can be
treated by the same argument applied twice, one for a shift from (B, µ) to (−B, µ), and
another for a shift from (−B, µ) to (B′, µ′).
Let p(B, µ) be the (largest) p supported in equilibrium given an adviser with (B, µ).
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Suppose now an adviser with (B′, µ′) is chosen, but the DM believes that the adviser will
continue to choose p = p(B, µ). We prove below that, given such a belief, the adviser with
(B′, µ′) will choose strictly higher p′ > p(B, µ). It will then follow that, since the adviser’s
best response correspondence is upper-hemicontinuous in the DM’s belief (by the Theorem
of Maxima), there must exist p′′ > p(µ) such that p′′ is supported under (B′, µ′), which
would imply that p(B′, µ′) > p(B, µ).
To prove the statement, suppose to the contrary that the adviser with (B′, µ′) will find
it optimal to choose p′ ≤ p(µ) given DM’s belief that the adviser will choose p(B, µ). The
disclosure sub-game following the effort choice p′ is characterized by the pair (S(B′, p(B, µ)),
a∅(B′, p(B, µ)). By the first-order condition, we must then have
∆(B′, µ′, p(B, µ)) = c′(p′) ≤ c′(p(B, µ)) = ∆(B, µ, p(B, µ)). (18)
For notational simplicity, let S(B˜) := S(B˜, p(B, µ)), s(B˜) := s(B˜, p(B, µ)), and s(B) :=
s(B˜, p(B, µ)) = s(B˜, p(B, µ)), and let s := s(B) and s′ := s(B′).
The proof follows several steps.
Step 1. The following inequality holds.
∆(B′, µ′, p(B, µ)) ≥ Π(B′, µ′)
:=
∫
s 6∈S(B)
[
(a∅(B′, p(B, µ))− ρs−B′)2 −B′2
]
γ(s;µ′)ds. (19)
Proof: By picking a nondisclosure interval S, given his type µ, effort p, and the DM’s
nondisclosure action a∅, the adviser’s expected utility is
pi (S;B, µ, p, a∅) := p
∫
s/∈S
[
(a∅ − ρs−B)2 −B2
]
γ (s;µ) ds− (a∅ − µ− b)2 − σ20.
Thus, since the adviser chooses S (B′, p (B, µ)) rather than S (B, p (B, µ)), it must be
that
pi (S(B′, p(B, µ));B′, µ′, p, a∅ (B′, p (B, µ))) ≥ pi (S(B, p(B, µ));B′, µ′, p, a∅ (B′, p (B, µ))) ,
which implies the desired inequality by the definition of pi. ‖
Step 2. Π(B′, µ′) > Π(B, µ).
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Proof: By substituting for a∅(B′; p(B, µ)) = ρs(B′; p (B, µ)), we can write
Π(B′, µ′) = (2B′ − 2ρs′)
∫
s 6∈S(B)
sγ(s;µ′)ds+ ρ2
∫
s 6∈S(B)
s2γ(s;µ′)ds
+
(
ρ2s′2 − 2B′s′
)∫
s 6∈S(B)
γ(s;µ′)ds.
We then obtain the desired inequality:
Π(B′, µ′)
= Pr{s /∈ S(B) | µ′}
{
2(B′ − ρs′)E[s | s 6∈ S(B), µ′] +
(
ρ2s′2 − 2B′s′
)}
+ρ2
∫
s 6∈S(B)
s2γ(s;µ′)ds
> Pr{s /∈ S(B) | µ}{2(B − ρs)E[s | s 6∈ S(B), µ′] + (ρ2s2 − 2Bs)}
+ρ2
∫
s 6∈S(B)
s2γ(s;µ′)ds
≥ Pr{s /∈ S(B) | µ}{2(B − ρs)E[s | s 6∈ S(B), µ′] + (ρ2s2 − 2Bs)}
+ρ2
∫
s 6∈S(B)
s2γ(s;µ)ds
= Π(B, µ).
The first inequality follows from the fact that (B′, µ′) > (B, µ) and that B ≥ 0. That
B′ ≥ B ≥ 0 implies 0 ≥ s = s(B) ≥ s(B′) = s′ (Step 3 in the proof of Proposition 1),
which in turn implies that B′ − ρs′ ≥ B − ρs ≥ 0. Next, E[s | s 6∈ S(B), µ′] ≥ E[s |
s 6∈ S(B), µ], since the Normal density γ(·;µ′) dominates in likelihood ratio the Normal
density γ(·;µ). We also have E[s | s 6∈ S(B), µ′] ≥ 0, since µ′ ≥ 0 (which follows from the
fact that |µ′| ≥ |µ| and that µ′ ≥ µ) and since S(B) ⊂ R−. Next, µ′ ≥ µ implies that
Pr{s /∈ S(B) | µ′} ≥ Pr{s /∈ S(B) | µ}. Combining all these facts imply the first inequality
in weak form. The inequality is strict, however, since B′ > B or µ′ > µ, which means one
of the inequalities established above must be strict.
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The second inequality is established as follows:∫
s 6∈S(B)
s2γ(s;µ′)ds = E[s2|µ′]− Pr{s ∈ S(B) | µ′}E[s2|s ∈ S(B), µ′]
= µ′2 − σ21 − Pr{s ∈ S(B) | µ′}E[s2|s ∈ S(B), µ′]
≥ µ2 − σ21 − Pr{s ∈ S(B) | µ}E[s2|s ∈ S(B), µ]
=
∫
s 6∈S(B)
s2γ(s;µ)ds,
where the inequality follows since |µ′| ≥ |µ|, since E[s2|µ′] ≤ E[s2|µ] (which follows from
the fact that γ(·;µ′) likelihood-ratio dominates γ(·;µ) and that s2 is decreasing in s for
s ∈ S(B) ⊂ R−), and since Pr{s ∈ S(B) | µ′} ≤ Pr{s ∈ S(B) | µ}. The string of
inequalities thus proves the claim. ‖
Combining Step 1 and Step 2, we have
∆(B′, µ′, p(B, µ)) > Π(B, µ). (20)
By definition, it also follows that
Π(B, µ) = ∆(B, µ, p(B, µ)). (21)
Combining (20) and (21) yields
∆(B′, µ′, p(B, µ)) > ∆(B, µ, p(B, µ)),
which contradicts (18). We have thus proven the statement of the proposition.
The case of B < 0 can be treated by applying the same sequence of arguments twice,
one for a shift from (B, µ) to (−B, µ), and then another for a shift from (−B, µ) to (B′, µ′).
The second step satisfies the hypothesized condition, so the same argument works. The
first step poses a slightly novel situation with Step 2. Yet, the same inequality works with
(B′, µ′) := (−B, µ).
Proof of Proposition 6: The first statement follows from the discussion preceding the
Proposition. The second statement is a corollary of Proposition 4 and the observation that
delegation and communication are equivalent when the adviser is like-minded.
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Proof of Proposition 7: First consider ρA ≥ ρDM2 . It is straightforward to verify that if
ρA ≥ ρDM2 , there is a full disclosure equilibrium in the disclosure sub-game, independent of
effort, p. Given full disclosure, the gain in utility for the adviser from observing a signal s
over not observing it is
∞∫
−∞
(ρDMs− ω)2γ(ω|s, ρA)dω +
∞∫
−∞
(−ω)2γ(ω|s, ρA),
where γ(·|s, ρA) denotes the posterior distribution over the state for the adviser with type
ρA given signal s. The above can be simplified via algebra to
ρDMs
2(2ρA − ρDM),
whose derivative with respect to ρA is 2ρP s
2, which is strictly positive at all s 6= 0. There-
fore, the marginal benefit of acquiring a signal is strictly higher for a more confident adviser,
and consequently he exerts more effort. Since we have full disclosure in the disclose sub-
game, it follows that the DM strictly prefers an adviser with ρA = 1 among all ρA ≥ ρDM2 .
For ρA <
1
2
ρDM , it suffices to prove that there is a unique equilibrium in the disclosure
sub-game, independent of effort, in which the adviser never discloses a signal. Consider
any nondisclosure action a∅ ≥ 0 (the argument for a∅ < 0 is symmetric to a∅ > 0). It is
straightforward to verify that the adviser’s best response in terms of nondisclosure region
is
S(a∅) =
(
−∞,− a∅
ρDM − 2ρA
]
∪
[
a∅
ρDM
,∞
)
.
Note that this is no disclosure if (and only if) a∅ = 0. It follows that a∅ = 0 is an equilibrium
independent of effort, p, because if the adviser is never disclosing, the DM will follow his
prior upon nondisclosure. To see that there is no equilibrium with a∅ > 0, observe that for
any a∅ ≥ 0, the set S(a∅) has expectation (with respect to the DM’s prior density on signals)
no greater than 0, and hence the DM’s best response to S(a∅), aN(p, S(a∅)), is no larger
than 0 for any p. Consequently, there does not exist a∅ > 0 such that a∅ = aN(p, S(a∅)).
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